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INTRODUCTION
As a scholarly project, global legal pluralism has been extraordinarily
successful, and it is not hard to see why. Legal pluralists had long observed
that, in any given social context, people are regulated by multiple different
legal and quasi-legal regimes and that these regimes are sometimes
associated with formal state law, but sometimes they are not.1 Global legal
pluralism took that insight and applied it to the post-Cold War international
and transnational arena at just the right moment. Circa 1998, international
and transnational institutions were proliferating, industry standard-setting
bodies and corporate codes of conduct were taking on new prominence, and
the rise of online interaction meant that social life was increasingly
deterritorialized and that almost any piece of electronic data or any online
interaction could implicate multiple regulatory regimes.2 As pluralists had
long noted, this complex web of regulatory bodies included some regimes
that were state-based, some that were built and maintained by non-state
actors, some that fell within the purview of local authorities and
Copyright © 2019 Paul Schiff Berman
* Walter S. Cox Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School. An earlier
version of this Essay was delivered as part of a symposium at Queen Mary University of London. I am
grateful to Maks Del Mar for inviting me to participate in the symposium.
1. For a discussion of the emergence of Global Legal Pluralism from earlier Legal Pluralism
scholarship, see Paul Schiff Berman, The New Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 225 (2009).
2. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Legal Jurisdiction and the Deterritorialization of Social Life, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF VIRTUAL AND AUGMENTED REALITY (Woodrow Barfield &
Marc Jonathan Blitz eds., 2019).
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jurisdictional entities, and some that involved international courts, tribunals,
arbitral bodies, and regulatory organizations.3
Global legal pluralism provided scholars with a theoretical lens for
conceptualizing the complex interactions among these various legal and
quasi-legal entities. Most importantly, the pluralist perspective allowed
theorists to extricate themselves from intractable and largely fruitless debates
about what should count as law and what should not. For example, many
international relations theorists, as well as scholars influenced by game
theory and other formalist models of power, argued that international law
was not truly law, given the absence of coercive enforcement.4 Likewise,
those focused only on official law-making bodies tended to miss the potent
power of non-state law-making, such as industry-specific regulatory entities
or standard-setting organizations.5 Meanwhile, networks of NGOs
promulgating rules, standards, ratings, transparency metrics and the like
often wielded important influence that was often missed by those only
willing to look at state-based law.6 And corporations, particularly online
platforms such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Apple, increasingly
deployed the tools of transnational legal enforcement more effectively than
territorially-bounded nation-states.7

3. For a more detailed discussion of this context, see PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL
PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012).
4. See, e.g., EDWARD HALLETT CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS, 1919–1939: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 85–88 (1964) (rejecting
internationalism/cosmopolitanism and stating that the principles commonly invoked in international
politics were “unconscious reflexions of national policy based on a particular interpretation of national
interest at a particular time”); JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2006) (using game theory and rational choice modeling in an effort to show that international law
has no independent valence); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
POWER AND PEACE 5 (5th ed. 1973) (1948) (noting that the “main signpost that helps political realism to
find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of
power”); KENNETH N. WALZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 122 (1979) (arguing that “although
states may be disposed to react to international constraints and incentives,” they do so only if such actions
conform with the state’s internal interests); Robert H. Bork, The Limits of “International Law”, NAT’L
INT., Winter 1989–1990, at 3 (arguing against the importance of international law); Francis A. Boyle, The
Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between International Law and International Politics, 10
CAL W. INT’L L.J. 193, 201 (1980) (arguing that World War II itself made clear that states cannot rely
solely on international law to protect their interests).
5. See, e.g., Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005).
6. See, e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION: MEASURING HUMAN
RIGHTS, GENDER VIOLENCE, AND SEX TRAFFICKING (2016).
7. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2018); see also Paul Schiff
Berman, Legal Jurisdiction and the Deterritorialization of Data, 71 VAND. L. REV. 11 (2018),
https://perma.cc/78ZY-8LYJ.
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Global legal pluralism applied the insights of socio-legal scholarship
and turned its gaze away from abstract questions of legitimacy and towards
empirical questions of efficacy. Thus, pluralists de-emphasized the supposed
distinctions between a norm, a custom, a law, a moral command, a
sociological consensus, a psychological imperative, or the like. Instead, a
pluralist approach focused on both enacted law and what has sometimes been
called “implicit” or “interactional” law, the purposive practices that groups
of people enter into that impact their practical sense of binding obligation.8
In addition, pluralists recognized that both enacted and interactional legal
norms tend to seep into consciousness over time, such that the mere existence
of these commands, whether enforced or not, may sometimes alter the power
dynamics or options placed on the table in policy discussions. Of course,
questions of legitimacy and efficacy are inextricably linked, but pluralists
argued that once we come to recognize multiple sources of transnational and
non-state authority, it is difficult to maintain any single abstract conception
of legal authority. At best, authority is always relative and always contested,
and our models for describing law should reflect that pluralism.9
Global legal pluralism also allowed scholars to emphasize the constant
interaction among these legal and quasi-legal systems. If authority and
jurisdiction are never absolute but are instead always relative and contested,
then we need to study that contestation, see how regulatory norms seep
across territorial borders, analyze networks of influence, and try to tease out
changes in legal consciousness over time: the often unnoticed and subtle
changes in people’s taken-for-granted sense of the way things are or have to
be.10 Significantly, these changes in legal consciousness can be influenced
by norms that are articulated even without coercive power behind them.

8. See WIBREN VAN DER BURG, THE DYNAMICS OF LAW AND MORALITY: A PLURALIST
ACCOUNT OF LEGAL INTERACTIONISM 98–105 (2014) (drawing on theorist Lon Fuller to develop a theory
of interactional law).
9. See NICOLE ROUGHAN, AUTHORITIES: CONFLICTS, COOPERATION, AND TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL THEORY (2013).
10. See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY 30–32 (1988) (examining “the role
of legal ideology in structuring mass consciousness”); PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE
COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 45 (1998) (defining “legal consciousness” and
arguing that “every time a person interprets some event in terms of legal concepts or terminology—
whether to applaud or to criticize, whether to appropriate or to resist—legality is produced” and “repeated
invocation of the law sustains its capacity to comprise social relations”); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS
AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 7 (1994) (“Legal (or
rights) consciousness . . . refers to the ongoing, dynamic process of constructing one’s understanding of,
and relationship to, the social world through use of legal conventions and discourses.”); SALLY ENGLE
MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS
AMERICANS 5 (1990) (arguing that “[l]egal consciousness is expressed by the act of going to court as well
as by talk about rights and entitlements” and that such “[c]onsciousness develops through individual
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Finally, moving from the descriptive to the normative, communities
drawing on the insights of global legal pluralism might sometimes
affirmatively seek to create or preserve spaces for productive interaction
among multiple, overlapping communities and legal systems by developing
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to bring those
communities and systems into dialogue rather than dictating norms
hierarchically. Such an approach is not derived from any overarching
universal set of substantive truths and does not require a commitment to
particular substantive values. They only require a pragmatic willingness to
engage with other possible normative systems and potentially to restrain
one’s own voice for the sake of forging more workable, longer-lasting
relationships and harmony among multiple communities. Thus, global legal
pluralism provided a useful framework for both designing and evaluating
legal institutions and procedures, separate from their substantive aims.
In short, during the past two decades, a rich body of work has
established pluralism as an important descriptive and normative framework
for understanding a world of overlapping jurisdictional assertions, both state
and non-state. During that time, there has been a veritable explosion of
scholarly work on legal pluralism, soft law, global constitutionalism, the
relationships among relative authorities, and the fragmentation and
reinforcement of territorial boundaries.
However, the very concept of global legal pluralism seems to contain a
conundrum at its core. How can any theory of law be focused on pluralism
and multiplicity and at the same time claim to be a “global” theory? This
conundrum may explain in large part the criticism global legal pluralism
receives from committed pluralists on the one hand and from committed
international law triumphalists on the other. The pluralists argue that the
normative side of global legal pluralism, by emphasizing procedures and
institutions that foster dialogue and interaction, is essentially recapitulating
a universalist liberal legality and therefore is not fundamentally pluralist at
all. The triumphalists, in contrast, worry that the descriptive account of law
that global legal pluralism provides will undermine hard-won international
law norms and institutions or rob those norms and institutions of distinctive
authority as hierarchically superior law.
My response, perhaps, is simply to plead “guilty” to both counts. But
of course there is more to it than that, and so it might be useful to play out
these arguments and responses in more detail. Accordingly, in what follows
I explore this conundrum, using Hans Lindahl’s sprawling and provocative

experiences”); Susan S. Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law, 17 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 39,
42 (1992) (noting that “law contributes to the articulation of meanings and values of daily life”).
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work of global legal pluralism, Authority and the Globalisation of Inclusion
and Exclusion,11 as a jumping-off point. In particular, I will draw on two
arguments that are at the core of Lindahl’s work.
First, and relevant to the pluralist objection, Lindahl observes that there
is no way to conceptualize a normative legal order, even of the most inclusive
sort, that does not somehow exclude as well as include, because there will
always be some who resist and refuse to recognize that order.12 Thus,
according to Lindahl, it is impossible to offer any normative account of law,
no matter how deferential to pluralism, that will not effectively eliminate
some of the pluralism by creating boundaries between what is included and
what is excluded. Lindahl’s discussion makes clear that even a purported
pluralist approach that rejects a globally uniform set of rules may
nevertheless still be a fundamentally universalist approach that is
ineradicably and inevitably always in tension with pluralism itself. Indeed,
there may be no way out of this conundrum if one wants to posit any sort of
normative account of how law or legal institutions ought to be
conceptualized.
Second, and relevant to the international law objection, Lindahl offers
what he calls the IACA model of law, which he defines as “institutionalised
and authoritatively mediated collective action.”13 This broad definition of
law echoes the core insight of legal pluralism: not all that is law or law-like
emanates from formal, state-based sources. Lindahl’s approach allows us to
speak of emergent global legal orders, whether from above or below. But
because it is a descriptive account based on empirical facts on the ground, it
robs formal international law of its own asserted superior position. Indeed,
this is in some ways a corollary of the point that there is no legal order that
includes without excluding. There will always be those who resist: those
who see themselves as excluded from a legal order, or those who refuse to
be included in that order. These resisters may well create their own emergent
legal order. And from the subject position of these resisters, the purportedly
global legal order that aims to include them may be deemed illegitimate.
Thus, as a fundamental matter, pluralism recognizes that there is no way to
sit outside the world and, from an Archimedian point, declare that some law
is universally legitimate and some law is not. Rather, the legitimacy or lack
of legitimacy of law is always a political argument and a sociological point
of contestation.
11. HANS LINDAHL, AUTHORITY AND THE GLOBALISATION OF INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION (2018).
12. See id. at 2 (“No global legal order is universal or universalisable because unification and
pluralisation are the two faces of the single, ongoing process of setting the boundaries of legal orders,
global or otherwise.”).
13. Id. at 1.
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The response, therefore, to the objections of the pluralists and the
triumphalists is fundamentally pragmatic. The concerns of both groups are
correct, but there is no way to fully extricate oneself from such concerns.
Any institutional design decision or procedural choice or judicial or
legislative rule will always and necessarily be “jurispathic,” as Robert Cover
would say,14 thereby choosing one law over another and striking a blow to
pluralism. At the same time, any honest descriptive account of law must
recognize that in the face of any assertion of law, even the most global and
all-encompassing, pluralism is never defeated; what is legitimately law to
one group will be illegitimate to others.
So, what to do in response to these two opposite critiques, both of which
are accurate? My answer is to recognize the conundrum and therefore
always to be self-conscious about one’s assertions of legitimacy or legality
or one’s exercises of hegemonic power. This emphatically does not mean
that one should never make such assertions; only that one should be aware
of the conundrums that inevitably render such assertions problematic. This
is what Lindahl calls “restrained collective self-assertion,”15 and it is likely
the most persuasive way of understanding how authority works in a world
where authority is only ever relative, not absolute.16
In what follows, I explore this conundrum of the global and the plural,
using Lindahl’s analysis to illuminate the central challenges from pluralists
and from internationalists, as well as the provisional answers that global legal
pluralism provides to try to meet those challenges. Part I focuses on pluralist
challenges to global theory. Part II turns to internationalist challenges to
pluralism. And Part III develops the idea of restrained collective selfassertion and the self-conscious imposition of jurispathic power as the most
effective provisional and imperfect response to both challenges.
I. THE PLURALIST CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL THEORY
As noted above, legal pluralism initially was a locally situated
descriptive legal theory. Thus, for example, anthropologists studied
particular social contexts and used the idea of legal pluralism to
conceptualize the relationship between specific colonial and indigenous
legal systems.17 Likewise, historians analyzed the numerous local sites of
14. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983) (describing judges as inevitably “people of violence” because their
interpretations “kill” off competing normative assertions).
15. LINDAHL, supra note 11, at 2.
16. See generally ROUGHAN, supra note 9.
17. See, e.g., Leopold Pospisil, Modern and Traditional Administration of Justice in New Guinea,
19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 93 (1981).
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jurisdictional contestation during the age of empire.18 And political theorists
analyzed Church/State relations, again in specific contexts.19 In these
analyses, scholars generally viewed legal pluralism as simply a reality,
neither good nor bad, neither desirable nor undesirable. Instead, they defined
their task principally as an exercise in thick description: cataloging the
inevitable hybridity that arises when two legal or quasi-legal systems occupy
the same social space, as well as the resulting strategic interactions that occur
among those navigating the multiple regimes.
As a descriptive enterprise, global legal pluralism is relatively
uncontroversial. After all, even the most die-hard nation-state sovereigntist
would likely acknowledge that sub-, supra-, or non-state normative systems
do impose real constraints that have real impacts. More controversial is the
idea that legal pluralism might be a normatively desirable approach to the
design of legal systems and procedures. This normative question, as noted
above, asks whether legal or governmental systems might sometimes
affirmatively seek to create or preserve spaces for productive interaction
among multiple, overlapping communities and legal systems by developing
procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices that aim to bring those
communities and systems into dialogue rather than dictating norms
hierarchically. Further, global legal pluralism suggests that such an
approach might be normatively desirable regardless of context, making it
potentially a globally generalizable theory.
Thus, while constitutions traditionally try to demarcate clear
hierarchical lines of authority among different decision-makers, a more
pluralist constitutional design might, instead, create increased opportunities
for dialectical legal interactions. For example, an institution such as
federalism, which allows for creative contestation both among states and
between the federal government and the states as a whole, can be seen as
opening space for dialogue.20 Or a court’s practice of publishing dissenting

18. See, e.g., LEGAL PLURALISM AND EMPIRES 1500-1850 (Lauren A. Benton & Richard J. Ross
eds., 2013).
19. As Marc Galanter observed, the field of church and state is the “locus classicus of thinking
about the multiplicity of normative orders.” Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private
Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 28 (1981); see Carol
Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM.
L. 741 (1988) (analyzing church-state relations in the United States from a pluralist perspective).
20. See, e.g., Robert Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 682 (1981) (arguing that, although it might seem perverse “to
seek out a messy and indeterminate end to conflicts which may be tied neatly together by a single
authoritative verdict,” we should “embrace” a system “that permits the tensions and conflicts of the social
order” to be played out in the jurisdictional structure of the system). More recently, scholars emphasizing
dynamic federalism have drawn on legal pluralism to argue for the creative possibilities inherent in

BERMAN (DO NOT DELETE)

388

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

4/28/2019 10:44 AM

[Vol 29:381

opinions can be seen as a mechanism that gives voice to contestation and
dialogue, allowing the dissenting voice to be heard in the marketplace of
ideas.21
Turning to the international and transnational realm, some who study
international law fail to find real “law” because they are looking for
hierarchically based commands backed by coercive power.22 In contrast, a
pluralist approach understands that interactions among various tribunals and
regulatory authorities are more likely to take on a dialectical quality that is
neither the direct hierarchical review traditionally undertaken by appellate
courts, nor simply the dialogue that often occurs under the doctrine of
comity.23
One example of a pluralist mechanism is the margin of appreciation
doctrine deployed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in order
to give play to local variation. The idea here is to strike a balance between
deferring to national courts and legislators on the one hand, and maintaining
“European supervision” that “empower[s the ECHR] to give the final ruling”
on whether a challenged practice is compatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights on the other.24 Thus, the margin of
appreciation allows domestic polities some room to maneuver in
implementing ECHR decisions in order to accommodate local variation.
Affording this sort of variable margin of appreciation usefully
accommodates a limited range of pluralism. It does not permit domestic
courts to ignore fully the supranational pronouncement (though domestic
courts have sometimes asserted greater independence).25 Nevertheless, it
does allow space for local variation, particularly when the law is in transition
or when no consensus exists among member states on a given issue.
Moreover, by framing the inquiry as one of local consensus, the margin of
appreciation doctrine disciplines the ECHR and forces it to move
federalism’s interactivity. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism as Legal Pluralism, in OXFORD RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM (Paul Schiff Berman ed., forthcoming 2019).
21. Cf. James Boyd White, Constituting a Culture of Argument: The Possibilities of American Law,
in WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE,
CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 231 (1984) (describing the importance of law as a forum for argument).
22. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2005); Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006)
(reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)).
23. See generally Robert B. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006).
24. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6538/74, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 276 (1979).
25. See Nico Krisch, The Open Architecture of European Human Rights Law, 71 MOD. L. REV.
183, 196–97 (2008) (discussing the evolution of the European human rights regime while tracing the
interaction of the European Court of Human Rights with domestic courts in the European Union); see
also LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 3 (2002)
(discussing a similar dialectical dynamic between domestic courts and the European Court of Justice).
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incrementally, pushing toward consensus without running too far ahead of
it. Of course, the actual decisions reached under the margin of appreciation
doctrine are inevitably subject to controversy, but as a procedural
mechanism the doctrine accommodates pluralism in a meaningful way.
The International Criminal Court’s (ICC’s) complementarity principle
is another example of a pluralist mechanism. Under this principle, the Court
cannot prosecute someone unless the suspect’s home country is unwilling or
unable to investigate.26 This means that space is created for the local nationstate to pursue the prosecution, but the specter of possible ICC jurisdiction
hovers in the background. Thus, as with the margin of appreciation doctrine,
complementarity occupies a middle ground between a fully internationalist
hierarchical approach on the one hand, and a fully statist approach on the
other.
Indeed, if the idea of managing, without eliminating, pluralism is the
lens, then projects such as the European Union itself become not a failure (as
we often hear), but something closer to the ideal, at least in conception if not
in every detail. Indeed, while universalists complain that Europe should have
a stronger commitment to centralized solutions and nation-state
sovereigntists complain that Belgian bureaucrats threaten state autonomy, a
normative vision of legal pluralism suggests that the EU’s institutional
apparatus has important benefits in its balance of both positions and its
efforts to accommodate both universalism and sovereigntist territorialism at
the same time.
This is only a small sampling of the many possible pluralist mechanisms
and approaches that communities (both state and non-state) might adopt, and
I have surveyed these mechanisms and many others in far more detail
elsewhere.27 For our purpose here, the important point is to see that this
normative global legal pluralism is not strongly universalist in the sense of
insisting on a single set of norms. Instead, it is simply suggesting a set of
possible procedural values that should be considered, recognizing that even
these procedural values might sometimes be over-ridden based on other
possible values.
Yet, even these comparatively weak proceduralist values are
undeniably a set of Habermassian dialogic values.28 And given that these
values are asserted as part of a global normative theory, albeit a proceduralist

26. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
27. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1155 (2007).
28. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
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one, for committed pluralists this normative global legal pluralism is overly
liberal and not really pluralist at all.29
I have argued elsewhere why I think my theory of normative global
legal pluralism, while potentially consonant with liberalism, is nevertheless
distinct from liberalism because it emphasizes participatory and dialogic
values that are not as core to the liberal model.30 But I cannot deny that it
certainly does espouse a set of dialogic values. And this proceduralist
version of pluralism is liberal to the following extent: what I am seeking are
procedures, institutions, and practices that bring multiple norm-generating
communities into greater dialogue with each other. For example, the margin
of appreciation doctrine creates an iterative interactive process among
communities that would not exist as strongly if the ECHR simply tried to
impose an international norm hierarchically on the one hand, or fully
deferred to local norms on the other. Likewise, a hybrid court or tribunal
with members of multiple communities sitting next to each other will tend to
create more dialogue among those communities in reaching an outcome. Or
a choice-of-law doctrine that requires decisionmakers to look to norms other
than those of their own community in order to find possible rules of decision
will likely result in more thoughtful consideration of those alternative
communities, regardless of the ultimate outcome of the case. In each of these
circumstances, the goal is to make decisionmakers more restrained in their
exercise of jurispathic power and more accommodating of difference. And
of course, these same principles could be, and sometimes are, adopted by
non-state communities in managing their interactions with others.
But it is obviously true that some communities don’t even want to join
the dialogue. Other communities wish to exclude certain segments of the
population (e.g., women) from the conversation. Some might even question
whether rational dialogue is what is needed to make decisions. For example,
if a religious leader seeks merely to impose an asserted universal truth by
fiat, there is little room for the conversation, deference, and accommodation
that a more pluralist mechanism would hopefully engender. Accordingly,
my proceduralist vision of pluralism contains a bias that favors inclusion,
participation, and conversation, and some illiberal communities will reject it
on that basis.
Thus, as some critics have pointed out, the sorts of procedural
mechanisms, institutional designs, and discursive practices I advocate
29. See, e.g., Alexis Galán & Dennis Patterson, The Limits of Normative Legal Pluralism: Review
of Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders, 11 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 783, 793 (2013) (book review).
30. Paul Schiff Berman, How Legal Pluralism Is and Is Not Distinct From Liberalism: A Reply to
Alexis Galán & Dennis Patterson, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 801 (2013).
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require “a larger normative environment in which pluralism has to be
negotiated.”31 This is true and, as noted above, that normative environment
is one in which reasoned discourse among multiple worldviews is both
accommodated and fostered as much as possible. Accordingly, there must
at least be agreement among the different normative communities to
participate in the common enterprise. If they refuse to participate then it
seems to me there is little that can be done within the legal arena.
In my book, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond
Borders,32 I draw on theorist Chantal Mouffe’s distinction between
“adversaries” and “enemies.”33 Adversaries are willing to enter the same
social space and contest substantive normative disagreements; enemies are
unwilling even to engage. The goal of my procedural pluralism is to
encourage as many normative communities as possible to become
adversaries rather than enemies. I argue that a system that routinely
squelches alternative voices is likely to create more enemies over time,
whereas one that seeks to allow multiple voices to be heard and tries for
accommodation as much as possible will be more successful at turning at
least some of those enemies into adversaries. Again, if this simply means
bringing more enemies into the ambit of a liberal legal order that seeks
maximum accommodation and deference to plural norms from plural
communities, then I am happy to embrace that form of pluralism (and that
form of liberalism).
But some want legal pluralism to be something far more radical (and
far more impractical). So, for example, in my book I make what I think is a
relatively moderate and restrained argument that liberal communities might
try to open limited space for Sharia courts to operate so long as those courts
do not trench upon fundamental values of the liberal community.34 And it
should be noted that even that moderate and restrained version of the
argument draws fire from critics across the political spectrum, from rights
advocates worried about illiberal practices to nation-state sovereigntists
worried about giving any authority at all to non-state communities. Yet
Alexis Galán and Dennis Patterson, in an article critiquing my book,35 want
to push much farther than I do. They claim that it’s not really pluralism
unless I go all the way and advocate that liberal communities allow Sharia
courts to operate regardless of whether or not they violate fundamental

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Galán & Patterson, supra note 29, at 798.
See BERMAN, supra note 3, at 145–46.
CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 13 (2000).
See BERMAN, supra note 3, at 225.
Galán & Patterson, supra note 29.
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values of the liberal community.36 This strikes me as absurd. Just because
one embraces insights from legal pluralism, after all, does not mean that the
values of pluralism must necessarily and always trump any other values a
community might hold. It simply cannot be that legal pluralism is only a
true normative position if it is pursued to the exclusion of all other values,
interests, and commitments.
Galán and Patterson treat my balancing of the values of pluralism with
other values as ambivalence. They correctly note that my book celebrates
pluralism as a descriptive fact, that I appreciate the existence of multiple
overlapping communities, and that I resist universalizing tendencies that
reduce diversity. But they see all of that as inconsistent with my effort to
encourage the creation of legal mechanisms to manage this pluralism.
However, these positions are not inconsistent at all. Indeed, they are likely
to be our only hope of addressing the reality of pluralism without either
squelching alternative views on the one hand, or having no legal order at all,
on the other.
I acknowledge that striking this balance is extraordinarily difficult and
perhaps impossible to achieve fully. But that does not mean it is incoherent
or analytically inconsistent to try. And most importantly my book simply
argues that it is normatively desirable for communities to make the effort.
Indeed, I am far less concerned with how individual cases are decided or how
individual institutions or mechanisms are designed than I am in trying to
ensure that whoever reaches those decisions considers the values of legal
pluralism as part of the calculus. So, yes, legal pluralism gets subsumed
within a broader set of values held by any given decisionmaker or
community, but that does not mean that factoring in the values of pluralism
does not create long-term changes in the way the decisionmaker or
community tackles procedural or institutional design challenges.
Lindahl too recognizes the pluralist critique, but he is even more
forthright in his response. Lindahl acknowledges that critics such as Galán
and Patterson are correct to a certain degree, but he argues persuasively that
it is not possible to create any truly pluralist normative order given that
pluralism is premised on the possibility (or inevitability) of resistance to any
normative order, however inclusive. According to Lindahl, even if we can
speak of emergent global orders in the plural, no single global order could
ever exist that would include without simultaneously excluding.37 As such,

36. See id. at 797 (arguing that my version of pluralism “cannot constitute a serious normative
position”).
37. See LINDAHL, supra note 11, at 1−3.
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he provocatively asserts that necessarily “humanity is inside and outside
global law.”38
As a result, even if we could develop a “global order of legally binding
and enforceable human rights,” that order would still simultaneously include
and exclude because there would always be some who would remain outside
that order, either refusing the categories of the global order or somehow
operating in resistance to all legal orders.39 According to Lindahl,
“unification and pluralisation are the two faces of the single, ongoing process
of setting the boundaries of legal orders, global or otherwise.”40
Thus, as Lindahl cogently observes, there can be no such thing as
normative global legal pluralism in a pure sense. As soon as any normative
regime is articulated, it cannot be fully plural. Or in any event, if it is, then
it will inevitably be global and plural simultaneously.
II. THE INTERNATIONALIST CHALLENGE TO
PLURALIST THEORY
In the last section we saw that the normative project of global legal
pluralism may inevitably and necessarily be too much of a global normative
project to satisfy committed pluralists. But on the flip side, the descriptive
project of global legal pluralism makes committed internationalists uneasy.
Legal pluralists, generally speaking, are unwilling to be confined by a
single formalist definition of law because they recognize that any such
definition is likely to derive from a particular subject position and therefore
will accord certain social action the mantle of law while denying other social
action the same respect. Indeed, for years, pluralists wrestled with trying to
define law before effectively giving up the project as inevitably fraught and
biased, privileging some instantiations of law over others.41 Accordingly,
pluralists turned the focus to observing sociological fact: what is it that
individuals and communities come to consider to be law over time? What
pronouncements of decisionmakers do they defer to, what rules do they obey,
and whose decisions are they willing to enforce? And what practices do they
enter into that impact their practical sense of binding obligation?
Lindahl, to his credit, does attempt a definition of law, but it is a
capacious one indeed. For him, law is “institutionalised and authoritatively
mediated collective action.”42 This definition allows him to include a variety
of “emergent” systems within his purview and to conceptualize the possible
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1.
See id. at 2.
Id.
See Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869, 869–75 (1988).
See LINDAHL, supra note 11, at 1.
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creation of global law from below, born not of treaties and nation-states, but
of more inchoate orders, such as the Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision, the International Accounting Standards Board, the consumerbased Clean Clothes Campaign, international standard-setting bodies, the
Codex Alimentarius, and even the law promulgated and imposed by online
platforms such as eBay.43
The problem with this capacious, non-essentialist vision of law, from
the point of view of internationalists, is that they have spent decades trying
to convince committed nation-state sovereigntists that international law is
superior law that should act as an independent constraint on states. Then
along come legal pluralists who claim that seemingly everything and
anything is law and it is a free-for-all, and that law is followed or not
followed as communities wish, and the only way to tell what is actually law
is to watch and see what people treat as law. After all, if every instance of
“institutionalised and authoritatively mediated collective action” gets to be
called law, then there is no way to authoritatively determine which of those
many legal regimes is superior to the others. Hans Kelsen would roll over in
his grave!44
Ironically, in some contexts the pluralist perspective on law is actually
helpful in defending the importance of international law. For example, as
mentioned previously, some international relations and formalist scholars
make polemical arguments against the very existence of international law,
based on the fact that it often does not have independent coercive power
behind it. Thus, according to these scholars, international law is simply an
epiphenomenon of state power: states follow international law when it is in
their interest to do so, and they ignore it when it is not.45
Against such assertions, legal pluralism offers an alternative way of
understanding how law actually operates. From a pluralist perspective, law
is not only that which coercively forces individuals (or states) to do things
that they do not want to do. Indeed, pluralists argue, coercive power is not
the only way that law can have an effect, either domestically or
internationally. As Martha Finnemore has noted, “[s]ocially constructed
rules, principles, norms of behavior, and shared beliefs may provide states,
individuals, and other actors with understandings of what is important or
valuable and what are effective and/or legitimate means of obtaining those
valued goods.”46 As a result, law has an impact not merely (or perhaps even

43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 2.
See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., 1967) (1960).
See sources cited supra note 4.
MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 15 (1996).
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primarily) because it keeps us from doing what we want. Rather, law
changes what we want in the first place.
Thus, law operates as much by influencing modes of thought as by
determining conduct in any specific case.47 It is a constitutive part of culture,
shaping and determining social relations48 and providing “a distinctive
manner of imagining the real.”49 For example, “[l]ong before we ever think
about going to a courtroom, we encounter landlords and tenants, husbands
and wives, barkeeps and hotel guests—roles that already embed a variety of
juridical notions.”50 Indeed, we cannot escape the categories and discourses
that law supplies.51 These categories may include ideas of what is public and
what is private, who is an employer and who is an employee, what
precautions are “reasonable,” who has “rights,” and so on.52 In short, “it is
just about impossible to describe any set of ‘basic’ social practices without
describing the legal relations among the people involved—legal relations
that don’t simply condition how the people relate to each other but to an
important extent define the constitutive terms of the relationship . . . .”53
In this vision of law, the fact that international legal norms do not have
coercive power behind them is not determinative because coercive power is
not the only way that law constrains. Rather, we imbibe legal norms and
cognitive categories even when we are not consciously aware of the norms
in question. We are persuaded by legal norms even when those norms are
not literally enforceable. We act in accordance with law because doing so
has become habitual, not because we seek to avoid sanction. We conceive
of our interrelations with others in terms of law because our long-term
interests are advanced by doing so, even when our short-term interest might

47. See sources cited supra note 10.
48. See, e.g., EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 10, at 41 (arguing that “law is a part of the cultural
processes that actively contribute in the composition of social relations”).
49. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY
173 (1983).
50. Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, Beyond Legal Realism? Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies,
and the Situation of Legal Scholarship, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 3, 20 (2001).
51. Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 105 (1984) (“[I]n actual
historical societies, the law governing social relations—even when never invoked, alluded to, or even
consciously much thought about—has been such a key element in the constitution of productive relations
that it is difficult to see the value . . . of trying to describe those relations apart from law.”).
52. Indeed, according to Sarat and Kearns:
Perhaps the most stunning example of law’s constitutive powers is the willingness of persons to conceive of
themselves as legal subjects, as the kind of beings the law implies they are—and needs them to be. Legal
subjects think of themselves as competent, self-directing persons who, for example, enter bargained-for
exchanges as free and equal agents.

Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Beyond the Great Divide: Forms of Legal Scholarship and
Everyday Life, in LAW IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21, 28 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1993).
53. Gordon, supra note 51, at 103.
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seem to counsel otherwise. And the existence of a legal norm alters the
constitutive terms of our relationships with others as well as the costs of
noncompliance.
All of these factors may be overcome in some circumstances. Indeed,
people sometimes violate domestic law just as states sometimes violate
international law. But in neither case does that mean that the law in question
has no significant constraining force. And only by thinking more broadly
about changes in legal consciousness and the complicated social, political,
and psychological factors that enter into the conceptualization of state
interests can we begin to understand how international law operates.
Yet, even though legal pluralism provides a cogent set of arguments to
defend the efficacy of international law, to international law triumphalists
that is insufficient because legal pluralism has no means of supporting the
legitimacy of international law as superior law. After all, if there are many
normative communities in the world all asserting forms of jurisdiction, who
gets to decide which assertions are permissible and which aren’t? In short,
who gets to decide who gets to decide?
To a legal pluralist, however, this is a nonsensical question. After all,
let us assume that we could get most people to agree that a particular
assertion of jurisdiction was legitimate, whatever that might mean.
Inevitably there would be some community somewhere that would resist this
jurisdictional claim. And from that community’s perspective the assertion of
jurisdiction would be illegitimate. This is what Lindahl means when he says
that no legal order can include without excluding.
Of course, we are accustomed to thinking of jurisdictional assertions
as the unique province of a sovereign entity. But jurisdiction is more
appropriately understood as a site of contestation and engagement among
multiple relative authorities. Indeed, the assertion of jurisdiction itself can
open space for the articulation of norms that function as alternatives to, or
even resistance to, sovereign power.
For example, in seventeenth-century England, common law courts
began to issue writs of prohibition in order to prevent the rival Court of High
Commission from hearing certain cases.54 In response, some critics argued
that the common law courts were overreaching and that the question of which
court had proper jurisdiction to hear a case could only be resolved by the

54. See CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR
EDWARD COKE 295 (1956) (explaining how Sir Edward Coke attacked the Ecclesiastical High
Commission through writs of prohibition); SIR EDWARD COKE, THE TWELFTH PART OF THE REPORTS OF
SIR EDWARD COKE, KT. 42 (London, E. Nutt et al., 4th ed. 1738) (1655) (discussing the use of writs in
Nicholas Fuller’s Case).
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king because the authority of all judges derived from him.55 In Prohibitions
del Roy, Lord Coke describes himself as having replied to such
characterizations of the king’s authority:
[T]rue it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent Science,
and great Endowments of Nature; but his Majesty was not learned in the
Laws of his Realm of England. . . . With which the King was greatly
offended, and said, that then he should be under the Law, which was
Treason to affirm, as he said; to which I said, that Bracton saith, Quod Rex
non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege [that the King should not
be under man, but under God and the Law].56

Thus, Coke refused to place the king beyond or above the domain of law.
By challenging the king and affirming the jurisdiction of the common
law courts, Coke asserted the primacy of law even over sovereign power. In
doing so, however, he also stripped the courts of the very “institutional
protection . . . that ordinarily stands behind” courts and enforces their
orders.57 After all, who is to enforce legal jurisdiction when the king stands
in opposition? This story makes clear both that courts can exercise power
separate from (and perhaps contrary to) the governing power of the state and
that the exercise of such power is risky and always contingent on broader
acceptance by communities (and coercive authorities) over time.
Nevertheless, despite the risk, the rhetorical assertion of jurisdiction itself
can have an important effect.58 For example, Coke’s memorialization of this
jurisdictional assertion in his treatise was undoubtedly part of the
Enlightenment movement to limit the power of kings and assert a higher rule
of law. Thus, one can see a direct line from Coke to Thomas Paine, who
declared that, in the new United States of America, “law is [K]ing.”59
It is, of course, a commonplace to say that courts lack their own
enforcement power, making them dependent on the willingness of states and
individuals to follow judicial orders. As discussed above, this observation is
often used as an argument for the irrelevance of international law itself:
because it is not state law, so the argument goes, it is subject to the realpolitik
55. See, e.g., BOWEN, supra note 54, at 63 (describing the debate as to who had authority to decide
jurisdiction in Prohibitions del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B. 1607)); see also BOWEN, supra note 54, at
303−04 (discussing the debate over the king’s “absolute power and authority” to decide legal disputes).
56. BOWEN, supra note 54, at 65.
57. Robert Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV. 179, 190
(1985).
58. There is some evidence that Coke’s version of his actions is not accurate and that he actually
capitulated to the king’s authority. See BOWEN, supra note 54, at 305−06 (observing that some historians
have rejected Coke’s account, relying on other seventeenth-century evidence, which indicates that Coke
actually threw himself on the mercy of the king). Even if this is so, however, the rhetorical assertion of
jurisdiction in his treatise might still have persuasive value over time.
59. THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense, in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 1, 29 (Philip
S. Foner ed., 1945) (1776).
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demands of pure power and is perhaps not really law at all. Similarly, we
might think the claims to jurisdictional authority by non-state communities
are not really law because the power of these non-state communities might
depend on the willingness of states to carve out zones of jurisdictional
autonomy for such communities.
But it is important to recognize that neither of these examples is
fundamentally different from how law always operates, even when
articulated by nation-state authorities. Indeed, courts can only ever exercise
authority to the extent that someone with coercive power chooses to carry
out the legal judgments issued.
Thus, the essence of law is that it makes aspirational judgments about
the future, the power of which depends on whether the judgments accurately
reflect evolving norms of the communities that must choose to obey them.
If this is so, then we might view extraterritorial lawmaking as substantially
similar to lawmaking within territorial bounds. For example, if a French
court issues a judgment against a U.S. corporation, it might be true that the
court’s command is only literally enforceable if an American authority will
agree to enforce it,60 but the same court’s decision against the corporation’s
French subsidiary is similarly dependent on the enforcement power of a
sovereign. After all, if the executive branch of the French government were
to refuse to enforce the order against the subsidiary, that order would have
no more force than the order against the American parent. Finally, regardless
of whether a U.S. sovereign entity ever enforces the French court’s order,
the court might never need literal enforcement from a U.S. court. If the U.S.
corporation wishes to continue commercial activity in France, the
corporation may choose to comply “voluntarily” anyway.61
So, if the assertion of jurisdiction is always an assertion of community
dominion, then all judicial decisions rely on both that particular community’s
acquiescence and the willingness of other entities to recognize, enforce, or
comply with the jurisdictional assertion. In this vision, we come to
understand that all jurisdictional assertions depend largely on the rhetorical
force of their articulation of norms to entice allegiance. Jurisdiction is really
“jurispersuasion,” the power to speak law and try to convince others to
follow that law over time.

60. See, e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1186 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev’d, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006) (refusing to enforce French court
judgment ordering Yahoo! to take steps to block hate speech illegal in France from being viewed in
France). For further discussion of the Yahoo! Case, as well as more recent, similar cases, see Paul Schiff
Berman, Yahoo! v. Licra, Private International Law, and the Deterritorialisation of Data, in GLOBAL
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ADJUDICATION WITHOUT FRONTIERS 393–405 (Watt et al. eds., 2019).
61. See Berman, supra note 60, at 395 (noting such voluntary compliance).
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This should not really be such a radical idea. We can all think of
examples where jurisdictional assertions and legal pronouncements are
contested, resisted, subverted, disobeyed, and transformed over time.
Likewise, no state or Empire has ever been able to govern absolutely with
no resistance. And of course there are always and forever many places in
the world where states have far less power than other legal and quasi-legal
entities.
The key point is that in order to resolve a normative conflict there is no
way to get outside of social context in order to play God and simply decree
that one set of norms or one decision-maker is authoritative and the rest are
not. Or perhaps another way to put it is that one can try to make such a
decree, but there is no reason to believe that such a decree will be universally
accepted. To the contrary, as soon as one makes such a decree, that too will
be resisted, contested, and subverted. There is no end to the contestation.
And that is perhaps the core descriptive insight of legal pluralism.
International law triumphalists may well object to this insight. And as
a political matter I may personally agree that certain international norms
should be followed by populations. And I certainly hope nation-states
sufficiently imbibe these norms and that they seep into consciousness
sufficiently that they will harden into the taken-for-granted sense of just
“how things are.” For example, the idea of individual human rights may
have become part of legal consciousness in that way. Certainly, people
around the world are now far more likely to frame their claims in the
language of rights than even a century ago.
But again, notice that we are back in the realm of politics and
sociological reality. If a norm seeps into legal consciousness, then it
functions effectively as law, whether it’s an international law norm, a nationstate norm, or a non-state norm. But as to abstract claims of legitimacy or
superiority, legal pluralism recognizes that any such claims are only ever
partial and contested. And if that serves to frustrate both nation-state
sovereigntists and international law triumphalists, so be it. It is the world we
actually live in. The sovereigntist models of legitimacy are merely distorted
simplifications of reality.
III. THE PROVISIONAL COMPROMISE: RESTRAINED
COLLECTIVE SELF-ASSERTION
If no normative theory can ever include without excluding and if all
assertions of legal norms are always and forever subject to contestation,
resistance, and subversion, then what is law to do? How can law effectively
navigate among the pluralism that exists and that will never be tamed
completely?
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Lindahl’s answer is what he terms restrained collective self-assertion.
Instead of trying to solve jurisdictional conflict through ever greater
universalism (which will always end up excluding anyway), Lindahl asks
communities asserting legal norms to suspend “the (full) application of the
law to protect the other (in ourselves) as other than us.”62 What he means by
this is not entirely clear, but he ultimately offers as examples many of the
sorts of institutional designs, procedural mechanisms, and discursive
practices that global legal pluralism has identified as possible strategies:
margins of appreciation, complementarity, subsidiarity, zones of autonomy,
hybrid participation agreements, reciprocal recognition, and so on.
As noted previously, I have discussed these and other mechanisms
extensively elsewhere63 and will not do so again here. But the key point is
that all of them (and many more) can be understood as ways that legal,
governmental, or quasi-governmental regulatory systems can seek to create
or preserve spaces for productive interaction among multiple, overlapping
communities and legal systems.
Significantly, deploying these pluralist procedural mechanisms,
institutional designs, or discursive practices does not require a commitment
to any overarching universal set of substantive values, although as discussed
in Part I above they do perhaps require a commitment to the liberal value of
dialogue across difference. Restrained collective self-assertion means only
a pragmatic willingness to engage with other possible normative systems and
potentially to restrain one’s own jurispathic voice for the sake of forging
more workable, longer-lasting relationships and harmony among multiple
communities.
Significantly, restrained collective self-assertion does not mean no
collective self-assertion. Sometimes, of course, such deference to the Other
will not be possible; this proceduralist vision of legal pluralism only seeks to
embed habitual practices in which deference is considered and attempted,
not in which it is always implemented.
Restrained collective self-assertion seeks to, at least, draw the
participants to the contestation into a shared social space. This approach
builds on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea that agreements are reached
principally through participation in common forms of life, rather than
through agreement on substance.64 Or, as Mouffe put it, we need to
transform “enemies”—who have no common symbolic space—into

62. LINDAHL, supra note 11, at 287.
63. Berman, supra note 27.
64. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 241 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans.,
3d ed. 1967).
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“adversaries.”65 Adversaries, according to Mouffe, are “friendly enemies[:]
. . . friends because they share a common symbolic space but also enemies
because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a different
way.”66 Ideally, law—and particularly legal mechanisms that foster restraint
in collective self-assertion—can function as the sort of common symbolic
space that Mouffe envisions and can therefore play a constructive role in
transforming enemies into adversaries.
Restrained collective self-assertion is global in the sense that it aims to
force consideration of what is necessary to have a smoothly functioning
trans-community legal order, what US Supreme Court Justice Harry
Blackmun once called “the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and
goodwill.”67 On the other hand, it is pluralist because it demands that the
assertion of Self always be conscious of the Other that is potentially being
excluded. Any assertion of jurisdiction and any legal decision is inevitably
jurispathic: it “kills off” one interpretation as it asserts another.68 Or, to put
it in Lindahl’s terms it simultaneously includes and excludes. The key point
is to make decision-makers self-conscious about their necessary jurispathic
actions.69
This global legal pluralist framework, therefore, aims simultaneously
to celebrate both local variation and international order, recognizing the
importance of preserving both multiple sites for contestation and an
interlocking system of reciprocity and exchange. Of course, actually doing
that in difficult cases is a Herculean and perhaps impossible task. Certainly,
mutual agreement about contested normative issues is unlikely and possibly
even undesirable. Thus, the challenge is to develop ways to seek mutual
accommodation, while keeping at least some “play” in the joints so that
diversity is respected as much as possible. Such play in the joints also allows
for the jurisgenerative possibilities inherent in having multiple lawmaking
communities and multiple norms.70 Always, the focus is on trying to forge
65. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 13 (2000).
66. Id.
67. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. See Cover, supra note 14 and accompanying text.
69. See Judith Resnik, Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert
Cover (An Essay on Racial Segregation at Bob Jones University, Patrilineal Membership Rules, Veiling,
and Jurisgenerative Practices), 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17, 25 (2005) (“[Cover] wanted the state’s
actors . . . to be uncomfortable in their knowledge of their own power, respectful of the legitimacy of
competing legal systems, and aware of the possibility that multiple meanings and divergent practices
ought sometimes to be tolerated, even if painfully so.”).
70. See Seyla Benhabib, Democratic Iterations: The Local, the National, and the Global, in
ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 45, 49 (Robert Post ed., 2006) (discussing and defining “jurisgenerative
processes”).
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the Wittgensteinian sort of shared social space that Mouffe describes for
transforming enemies into adversaries.
Taken together, these principles provide a set of normative criteria for
evaluating the ways in which legal systems interact. In addition, the
principles could inform a community (whether state-based or not) that
wishes to design mechanisms, institutions, or practices for addressing
pluralism. Of course, such criteria are not exclusive. For example, a
procedure or practice that manages pluralism well but denies certain norms
of fundamental justice might be deemed problematic, regardless of its
embrace of pluralism. Thus, I do not say that embracing pluralism always
overrides other concerns. After all, many legal and quasi-legal orders are
repressive and profoundly illiberal, and their norms may be resisted on those
grounds. Instead, the important point is simply that pluralist considerations
should always at least be part of the design, inculcating habits of mind that
promote deference and restraint. Accordingly, decision-makers should
always ask: Are there other normative systems at play here? Should I
restrain my jurispathic voice? Is there some other decision-maker who might
more appropriately speak to this issue? Are there ways I could develop a
hybrid decisional framework that brings more voices to the table? And how
can I design ongoing practices, procedures, or institutional arrangements to
constitutionally embed these inquiries?
CONCLUSION
As Lindahl recognizes, no global theory of law can ever truly be
global; it will always exclude even as it includes. There will always be those
who do not see themselves as within the community being asserted, and these
outsiders will likely view the asserted community jurisdiction as illegitimate,
no matter how “global” that community purports to be. Likewise, there is
no way to stand outside of all social systems and somehow declare without
objection that one set of norms is definitively more legitimate than others.
Accordingly, the best we can do is to recognize the interaction of these
various forms of “institutionalised and authoritatively mediated collective
action.”
Thus, global legal pluralism is neither fully global nor fully pluralist.
To the extent it embraces as a normative matter institutional designs,
procedural mechanisms, and discursive practices to effectuate an
overarching goal of fostering dialogue across difference, it is asserting a
global procedural value of dialogue and therefore is not fully pluralist. And
to the extent it refuses, as a descriptive matter, to anoint some legal assertions
as necessarily hierarchically superior to others, it is not fully global and will
always be subject to criticism from committed internationalists. The best
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global legal pluralism can do is to occupy a middle ground: adopting as
capacious a definition of law and authority as possible, while pushing for
any collective self-assertion to be self-conscious and restrained, all in order
to keep the dialogue alive.
Ultimately, we must recognize that communities assert law as part of a
conversation that never ends; they wield authority as part of an endless
Mobius strip of contestation, they make choices amid the pluralism, and
those choices inevitably squelch some voices and honor others. It is the selfrecognition of our own limitations as authorities that encourages us to act in
a self-restrained manner and in deference to other perspectives and pointsof-view, at least to the extent we can. And, at the end of the day, that is
probably the best that law can ever do: foster dialogue across difference and
inculcate habits of self-restraint in imposing norms.

